ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
Economists, educators, and policymakers generally agree that better teachers are likely to lead to more effective schools. But the question of how to attract better teachers remains open. A natural economic solution is to raise teacher pay. From 1960 to 1998, teacher salaries rose in real terms by 43 percent, outpacing non-teacher salaries. At the same time, however, the IQ scores of those choosing to teach fell, and evidence on the relationship between salaries and measures of teacher quality or performance has been mixed (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 1999; Murnane, et al, 1991; Figlio, 2002) .
Beginning in the 1960's, some states began testing prospective teachers in a direct effort to ensure teachers meet minimum standards for basic skills and subject knowledge.
1 By 1999, 41 states required applicants to pass some sort of standardized certification test such as the National Teacher Examination or Praxis examinations published by the Educational Testing Service. 2 Although there is some cross-state reciprocity in the form of probationary and provisional licensing, states relying on tests for certification typically require newly employed teachers to pass their own tests even if they are licensed in other states.
As a theoretical matter, the impact of teacher testing is ambiguous. Test requirements may establish a minimum achievement standard, as their proponents argue, but certification requirements may also deter high-quality applicants from teaching in the public schools. Moreover, stricter certification procedures raise 3 barriers to entry that increase labor costs, and may be seen as especially costly by the most experienced teachers or teachers with attractive employment options in other fields.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of state-mandated certification tests on teacher quality and teacher salaries. Data for our study come from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), a nationally representative repeated cross-section of teachers and schools, initially conducted during the 1987-88 school year and most recently available for 1999-2000. This sample coverage is useful since testing requirements have grown most sharply in recent years. In addition to providing information on teacher salaries, the 1987-88, 1993-94, and 1999-2000 waves of the SASS include measures of teacher educational background that we take to be indicators of teacher quality. Our analysis starts by showing that state provisions on teacher testing were binding in the sense that teachers were indeed more likely to be tested after states introduced a testing requirement. Consistent with the notion that certification requirements establish barriers to entry, we find that teacher testing increases teacher salaries. Despite the corresponding increase in salaries, however, we find no evidence that testing increases the quality of colleges attended by new teachers or the likelihood that teachers teach material studied in college or graduate school.
II. Background and Context
A 1986 report of the Carnegie Task Force on Education and a follow-up report released in 1996 called for the introduction of more centralized systems of certification for public school teachers. A policy of stricter and more centralized teacher licensing has also received support from the National Education Association and groups promoting education reform (Ballou and Podgursky, 2000) . Proposed licensing systems typically involve the accreditation of education programs, longer apprenticeships, and teacher testing. Proponents of teacher licensing point to the spread of medical licensure in the early 20 th Century as evidence that licensing raises professional standards. On the other hand, economists have long warned that licensing and certification are potentially cost-raising barriers to entry (e.g., Friedman and Kuznets, 1945) . 3 The literature on occupational regulation distinguishes between mandatory licensing such as required of medical professionals and voluntary certification such as obtained by auto mechanics.
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Moreover, there is little hard evidence for any consumer benefits of mandatory occupational licensing, including in medicine. In this paper, we attempt to estimate the impact of what is perhaps the simplest component of teacher licensing provisions, a requirement that teachers pass a certification test that can be seen as analogous to medical boards and legal bar exams.
In a recent survey of research on occupational licensing, Kleiner (2000) observes that more American workers are affected by licensing requirements than belong to unions or are covered by the minimum wage.
Yet there are remarkably few studies of the impact of licensing on wages or productivity. Standard economic arguments suggest licensing provisions are likely to affect economic outcomes through a number of channels.
First, occupational licensing may provide a signal of worker quality and help to maintain quality standards when information about quality is imperfect. Indeed, this is the stated rationale for government-imposed licensing requirements. As Kleiner (2000) notes, however, the evidence of consumer benefits from most licensing requirements is thin or nonexistent. In addition, mandatory licensing requirements impose a barrier to occupational entry that is likely to increase wages in the licensed occupation.
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One of the few previous attempts to estimate the effect of teacher licensing requirements is a study by Berger and Toma (1994) , who find that SAT scores are lower in states that require teachers to have a Master's degree. Berger and Toma hypothesize that this negative relationship may be evidence of a supply response by prospective teachers who view the education requirement as costly, particularly so for talented teachers with better alternatives. Also consistent with this entry-barriers story, Hanushek and Pace (1995) find that state requirements for courses and tests significantly lower the probability prospective teachers complete training, again using cross-state variation.
A related study of licensing requirements is by Kleiner and Petree (1988) , who link state licensing requirements with average teacher pay, pupils' SAT and ACT scores, and high school graduation rates. Their 4 Dentistry appears to be the most widely studied occupation in research on licensing. See Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) for references to earlier work on dentists. Kleiner (2000) Another related study is Goldhaber and Brewer (2000) , who link student achievement with state teacher licensing and testing requirements. Their analysis does not exploit changes in state provisions over time, and the effects of testing enter only as interactions with other licensing provisions.
Most studies of the economic consequences of occupational licensing look at the medical and dental professions. In a study of dentistry, for example, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) found that people in states that strictly regulated entry to dentistry had dental health no better than those in states with less regulation.
Dental regulation, however, does appear to increase both the hourly earnings of dentists and consumers' cost of dental care. 4 Similarly, in a recent study of immigrant physicians in Israel, Kugler and Sauer (2003) found that immigrant physicians who obtained a license to practice medicine in Israel had sharply higher earnings than those who did not. At the same time, a comparison of OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the effect of licensing suggests that doctors who obtain licenses and end up practicing medicine have lower earnings potential than those who do not. It should be noted, however, that teachers differ from medical professionals in that they are more likely to work in the public sector. Regulation may more effectively reveal worker quality in the absence of the market forces at work in the private sector.
III. Theoretical Framework
Although the theoretical impact of teacher testing on wages seems clear cut, the effect of testing on quality is less so. The policy objective that motivates teacher testing, as with other worker screening devices, 5 See also Lelande (1979) . For more recent and more elaborate models along these lines, see, e.g., Wang (1997) and W ang and Weiss (1998) .
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is to identify and hire those most qualified to teach. In practice, however, effective testing strategies are hard to design since tests are noisy predictors of worker quality. Moreover, testing is costly for employers and employees. Teacher supply therefore shifts in the face of testing to reflect the time and effort job applicants expend in being tested. Finally, risk averse workers should see employment opportunities that are contingent on stochastic test results as less attractive than unconditional offers.
A large theoretical literature looks at the impact of worker screening mechanisms on wages and job assignments. We use basic elements of the Weiss (1980, 1981) worker screening model to discuss the possible implications of standardized testing for teacher quality. 5 Because school districts are not necessarily profit maximizers or even costs minimizers, we focus on the impact of test-based hiring standards on teachers' labor supply, as opposed to the more complex question of how worker testing affects equilibria in competitive markets.
Suppose an applicant for a teaching job can earn an alternative wage, w i , and teachers are paid a fixed wage w, which might be set by collective bargaining. Job applicants must be tested, a process which they view as costing an amount c. We can think of c as a monetary cost or as the cost of time and effort directed towards preparation and completion of the test. More generally, testing might involve a probationary period, in which case any wage reduction during the probation period is part of the testing cost.
Worker i passes the test with probability p i . We presume the test has some screening value, so that p i and w i are positively correlated. In other words, higher quality applicants, as measured by outside earnings potential, are more likely to pass the test. Assuming teachers maximize expected utility with von NeumannMorgenstern utility of income U(C), applicant i must be offered a wage that satisfies
if he or she is to find it worth applying for a test-contingent job. Clearly as c increases, the wages offered teachers, w, must be higher to obtain an applicant pool of the same quality. This is the entry-barrier effect on wages; positive c reduces the supply of applicants, holding fixed the underlying distribution of quality as measured by w i . Note also that this deterrent effect is larger with risk averse than with risk-neutral applicants. Risk-neutral applicants require only that p i (w!w i ) $ c.
We highlight three mechanisms by which testing affects the average quality of newly hired teachers.
Continuing to think of quality as indexed by the alternate wage, w i , suppose that school boards, who do not observe w i , would like to select applicants with w i $w G . For simplicity, suppose also that applicants are risk neutral and that the certification test is a perfect screen of teacher ability. In other words, the test is designed so that p i =1 if w i $w G and is zero otherwise. Then average teacher quality in the testing regime is
This average can be compared with the average teacher quality in a no-testing regime, E[w i | w > w i ]. This comparison is depicted in figure 1 for uniformly distributed w i . The shaded portion of the top panel of the figure represents the set of applicants who are eligible and choose to teach in a world without teacher testing requirements. The shaded portion of the middle panel represents the set of applicants who are eligible and who choose to teach in a world with a testing requirement and a test that measures ability perfectly. The imposition of a lower bound, w G , clearly increases quality. We label this mechanism the information effect because the test provides schools with information about applicants' ability that allows them to avoid hiring some low-ability teachers.
If testing is viewed as costly, some applicants will choose not to teach to avoid having to study for and take the test. Because the cost is common to all individuals in this model, applicants on the margin between teaching and an alternative occupation are the highest-quality teachers. In other words, these applicants have the best outside options. As c rises, more of these marginal applicants are discouraged from teaching (the discouragement effect in the figure) and average quality may decline. This decline in average quality occurs in spite of the fact that the lower quantiles of the quality distribution will have increased if 8 testing is effective. More generally, however, the discouragement effect is ambiguous since c may be related to opportunity costs. If , for example, c reflects time spent preparing for the test, costs are increasing in w i , and the discouragement effect is clearly negative. If, however, costs are decreasing in ability, as might be true if test preparation is easier for the more able, the marginal applicant will have poor outside options.
The third mechanism through which testing may affect the average quality of newly hired teachers comes into play when, as seems likely, tests measure applicant ability imperfectly. Specifically, suppose applicants pass the test if w i + 0 i > w G , where 0 i is a mean-zero random error uncorrelated with w i . Applicants can now be classified in the groups listed below, numbered as in figure 1:
School districts prefer applicants in groups (1) and (2) but regulation requires them to hire applicants in groups (1) and (3). Since the average ability of applicants in group (3) is less than that in group (2), noise in testing reduces the average ability of teachers hired. 6 We call this an ineligibility effect since some qualified applicants are made ineligible for teaching jobs by the testing requirement. Angrist and Guryan (2004) Although these quality measures are not as detailed as we would like, the average SAT score at teachers' undergraduate institutions is a frequently used measure of new teacher quality (see, e.g, Figlio, 2002) . Following the discussion of quality effects, we discuss results from a match of individual SAT and Praxis scores which shed some light on the question of whether institution-based quality measures are informative.
The other outcomes examined here include an indicator for whether the teacher majored in the subject she teaches, an indicator for whether the teacher has an alternative (i.e., non-standard) certification status on her current job, and the demographic characteristics of teachers. Subject major is relevant because school district administrators often claim to be interested in attracting math and science teachers who are 10 trained in their subjects. The alternative certification variable may also be taken as a measure of teacher qualifications. In addition, this variable provides an indicator of concurrent changes in hiring practices.
For the purposes of our statistical analysis, individual teacher information was aggregated to the district level. Because testing should affect new teachers the most, we created aggregates for two sets of teachers in addition to the full sample, those hired in the past year (first-year teachers) and those with three years or less teaching experience (inexperienced teachers). Examples of the resulting aggregated outcome variables are the fraction of first-year teachers in each district who were Hispanic, and the fraction of inexperienced teachers in each district who had an alternative certification. Outcomes for first-year and inexperienced teachers were computed for subsamples of districts with first-year or inexperienced teachers.
The samples used here exclude districts with less than 50 pupils (i.e. below about the first percentile in the district size distribution). The samples include public schools only and omit charter schools. Finally, information on state testing requirements was obtained from published summaries. For additional details on the construction of variables and our extract, and a list of references on state testing regulations, see the data appendix. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by survey year. Each round of the survey contributes almost 5,000 districts to the total sample. The typical district has about 3,000 pupils and 160 teachers. The table also shows the proportion of districts with inexperienced teachers (hired in the 3 years preceding the survey) and the proportion of districts with teachers hired in the past year. Over 40 percent of districts have inexperienced teachers and almost 20 percent have teachers hired in the past year.
B. Descriptive statistics
The first outcome variable used to measure the impact of teacher testing is wages. Although the theoretical discussion suggests the effect of testing on the distribution of teachers' alternate wages (i.e., their quality) is ambiguous, the effect on teachers' own pay is likely to be positive since testing restricts supply 8 A few large states reversed their Basic Skills testing requirements so the proportion of districts requiring testing dipped between 1993 and 1999.
11
(note that w!c has to exceed the quality threshold). The SASS reports the wages paid to teachers in each district by schooling and experience level. In particular, wages are reported separately for teachers with a
Bachelor's degree (B.A.), with a Master's degree (M.A.), and with a Master's degree plus 20 or more years of experience. Table 1 shows teacher wages for those with a B.A. were equal to 25,000-26,000 (in 1999 dollars) in the sample period. Wages went up between 1993-94 and 1999-2000. Wages were also about 10 percent higher for those with an M.A., and much higher for experienced teachers with a Master's degree.
The quality analysis begins by looking at average SAT scores in teachers' undergraduate institution and whether the institution was coded as a research university or liberal-arts college. Note that the SAT and Carnegie variables cannot be linked to the 1990-91 SASS because this round did not identify teachers'
undergraduate institutions. The college-based quality variables generally show fairly stable quality over the sample period. In contrast, there was an increase in the proportion of inexperienced and new teachers with alternative certification, and an increase in the proportion of teachers who have a degree in the subject they teach. Finally, the table provides descriptive information for two additional quality variables, the proportion of teachers with a degree in the subject they teach and the proportion with alternative state certification, as well as for teachers demographic characteristics.
C. Test prevalence and requirements
The proportion of districts subject to state-mandated Basic Skills testing increased from just over 40% in 1987-88 to 70% in 1993-94 . This can be seen in the first row of (e.g., districts who report not using a subject test in a state that requires subject testing were recoded as using a subject test). Not surprisingly, these recoded variables have higher means than the raw SASS responses in the second three rows. They also show a consistent pattern of increasing test use over time. The impact of state requirements on testing is gauged below on the basis of these recoded variables.
D. Effects of state testing requirements on testing
The impact of state testing requirements on test use is summarized by regressing dummies for test use on dummies for state mandates, along with state and year main effects, dummies for urban, suburban, and rural districts, district enrollment, district fraction minority enrollment, and a quadratic in the state unemployment rate. In particular, table 3 reports estimates of the coefficients " 1 and " 2 on basic skills and subject test mandate dummies, b jt and s jt , in the equation
where y djt is an indicator for test requirements in district d in state j in year t, : j and * t are state and year effects, and X djt is the vector of other covariates. Some of the models combine the separate basic skills and subject dummies into a single dummy for "any test".
Estimates of equation (3) can be seen as a calibration exercise telling us the difference between rates of test use with and without state requirements. Table 3 shows that state-required testing of teachers' basic 10 The regression estimates reported here and elsewhere in the paper were weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors are corrected for state-year clustering. Standard errors clustered by state only are similar.
14 skills increases the likelihood of basic skills testing in school districts by about 50 percent. As can be seen in column 2, subject test requirements are also correlated with the use of basic skills tests, but column 3
shows that when both dummies are included, the basic skills requirement dominates. The reverse pattern appears in columns 5-7 for models with the use of subject tests on the left hand side. The imposition of any test requirement also increases the likelihood of testing by about 50 percent. Moreover, as the lower twothirds of table 3 shows, these effects are similar when the sample of districts is limited to those that have new or inexperienced teachers.
V. Results

A. Effects on wages
State testing requirements are associated with slightly higher wages. This can be seen in table 4a, which reports estimates of equation (3) for models with the log of teacher salaries on the left hand side.
Many of the estimated salary effects are significant. For example, column 1 shows that the salaries of teachers with a B.A. degree are about 2.4 percent higher when states require a test of basic skills, an effect estimated with a standard error of 0.9 percent. 10 Subject test requirements also appear to be associated with higher wages, though the estimated effects of testing requirements are not significant when both the subject and basic skill testing variables are entered at the same time.
Most new teachers have a B.A. As the estimates in columns 5-8 and 9-12 show, however, state testing requirements are also associated with higher wages for teachers with an M.A. and for experienced teachers with an M.A. Since teachers with more advanced degrees and more experience are less likely to have been hired recently, these effects may reflect the maintenance of relative wages by shifting the entire pay scale in response to testing requirements. It should also be noted that in many states with testing 11 The timing of the adoption of state testing requirements seems to be correlated with state-level socioeconomic status and educational outcomes. States with lower NAEP scores, fewer high school graduates in 1928, a lower Putnam Social Capital Index, and more poorly ranked health care were more likely to require teacher testing by 1988. An analysis of trends in dropout rates, however, indicates that for this variable at least, selection into licensing status is based on permanent differences across states. These differences should therefore be accounted for by state fixed effects. We thank Doug Staiger for pointing out these particular correlations.
12 Angus (2001) and Ravitch (2002) suggest teacher certification requirements have been at the heart of battles over entry to the teaching profession since the mid-19th century. Barriers to entry commonly increased in times of relatively abundant teacher supply and testing was a relatively common component of teacher certification in the early part of the 20 th century. Barriers have typically been relaxed in times of shortage and/or high demand (e.g., WW II). We note, however, that endogeneity of this sort would tend to bias our wage effects downwards.
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requirements for new hires, more experienced teachers are subject to periodic re-certification tests.
An alternative interpretation of the increase in wages for more educated or more experienced teachers is that these effects reflect some sort of omitted variables bias. The possibility of omitted variables bias is also raised by the fact that the estimated wage effects are not markedly larger when the sample is limited to districts with inexperienced and new-teachers. Because testing requirements are time-varying state-level variables, the most likely source of bias is some sort of state-specific trend in teacher wages in states that adopt testing requirements. 11 Therefore, as a check on this, we re-estimated the wage equations using a model that adds state-specific linear trends to specification (3). This controls for the fact that teacher wages may be increasing due to secular trends that contribute to the demand for higher entry barriers. One possibility, for example, is that unions raise entry barriers in good times. On the other hand, our survey suggests districts and therefore perhaps also states want to weaken formal requirements when teachers are hard to find.
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The results of estimating equation (3) with state-specific linear trends, reported in Table 4b , show even stronger wage effects than appear in Table 4a . For example, the imposition of a state test of basic skills is associated with roughly 3.3% higher wages for teachers with a B.A., a precisely estimated effect.
Moreover, the effects of requiring tests of basic skills and subject matter remain significant when entered jointly. The fact that estimates with state trends are larger those without is consistent with the view that testing provisions are weakened in a strong economy. Perhaps most importantly, the pattern of effects is now Tables   4a and 4b . The 2SLS interpretation, however, turns on whether state regulations satisfy an exclusion restriction. In practice, it seems likely that mandatory testing could affect the wage distribution in districts that tested even in the absence of a state requirement.
B. Effects on quality of undergraduate institution
Although state testing requirements are associated with an increase in the use of teacher tests and with higher teacher wages, there is little evidence that this translates into better teachers, at least along the quality dimensions we can measure. These results can be seen in Table 5a , which reports quality estimates for the samples of new and inexperienced teachers since these are the samples where we expect effects to 14 In future work, we plan to look at student outcomes as well as teacher characteristics. It is worth noting, however, that because districts may reduce their demand for other productive inputs (e.g., small classes) in response to the requirement to purchase more of the skills measured by teachers' test scores, it seems likely that achievement effects will be smaller than effects on teacher characteristics. We thank Doug Staiger for pointing this out.
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be largest. For example, columns 1-4 of Table 5a show no evidence of an association between testing requirements and the quality of teachers' undergraduate institution as measured by average SAT scores.
While the subject test requirement is associated with a marginally significant increase in test scores when both testing requirements are entered jointly and the sample includes only districts with inexperienced teachers (column 3), the corresponding effect is smaller and insignificant for all other specifications in this sample, and negative and insignificant in the sample of districts with new teachers. Similarly the estimates in columns 5-8 of Table 5a point to the absence of an association between testing and the quality of teachers' undergraduate institutions as measured by the institutions' Carnegie classification as a research university or a liberal arts college.
14 As noted in the theoretical section, the extent to which teacher testing can raise teacher quality is determined partly by the power of the test as a quality screen. The screen may be weak since pass rates for the widely-used Praxis II test are very high; about 87 percent of 1997 applicants obtaining a passing score on the composite known as "General Praxis II" (Gitomer, Latham, and Ziomek, 1999) . The fact that most applicants pass could well explain weak effects of state test requirements on the quality distribution. At the same time, the implied Praxis failure rate of 13% is taken from a population that is already (for the most part) subject to mandatory testing and is therefore preparing for the test. The failure rate in this population is probably lower than the failure rate that arises when testing is introduced in an applicant population not previously subject to testing. (And, of course, many states use tests other than the Praxis. Failure rates on the Massachusetts Teachers Exam, for example, have been much higher).
To get a sense of what the imposition of stricter testing standards might mean for the applicant quality distribution as we measure it, we used a unique data set provided by the Educational Testing Service 15 These data are not publicly available, and were graciously provided for the purposes of this project by ETS, with permission of the College Board. 16 Regressions adjust for teachers' year of birth and state of residence.
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(ETS) linking the SAT scores to the Praxis results of prospective teachers, most recently for 1997. These data, documented in Gitomer, Latham, and Ziomek (1999), allow us to determine the relationship between alternate testing standards on the Praxis II and the SAT scores of teacher applicants. 15 Moreover, we can look at the extent to which the effect of passing Praxis on SAT scores is diluted by replacing individual applicants' SAT scores with their college average score.
Our analysis here uses information for 1997, the sample year in which testing was most widespread.
We discarded applicants who took the test voluntarily in the hope that this makes the results more representative. The analysis begins by exploring the relationship between alternative standards for passing Praxis and SAT scores. The regression-adjusted SAT score differential between the 87 percent who passed the General Praxis Standard in 1997 and those who failed is 224 points. 16 Imposing a somewhat higher standard which defines passers as applicants who succeed on all three core batteries, the pass rate is 75 percent and the SAT gap is 235 points.
The next step is to estimate the same score differential as measured by undergraduate institutional average-rather than individual-SAT scores. Those meeting the general Praxis II standard had a 55 point higher institutional average SAT score as measured using the ETS's 1997 sample, and a 46 point higher average as measured using the 1983 average SAT variable used in Table 5a . Likewise, those meeting the "three core battery" standard had a 79 point higher institutional average SAT score as measured using the 1997 ETS sample, and a 55 point higher average as measured using the 1983 average SAT variable used in Table 5a . This comparison of pass/fail differentials for individual and institutional-average SAT scores is consistent with the fact that teachers' undergraduate institution explains 20-30 percent of the total variance in their individual SAT scores. 17 The effects may be further diluted by the fact that about half of districts in states with no testing requirement nevertheless used tests. In practice, however, the testing regime in such states was less binding.
18 Only math, science and English teachers were coded as having majored in the same subject they teach. At the same time, the sample is not limited to math, science, and English teachers because this may be an outcome.
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Finally, we turn to the mechanical impact of a state-wide testing requirement on teacher quality, as measured by the average SAT score of teachers' undergraduate institutions. As discussed above, the differential between those passing and failing the test is on the order of 50 points for most standards. In the absence of any discouragement effect on highly-able teachers, turning away the 13 percent of applicants who failed the General Praxis II section would lead to a 6 point (46 point gap for passers × .13 failure rate) increase in the 1983 average SAT variable used in Table 4a . The corresponding figure for a stricter standard relying on the three core battery tests is 13.75 points (55 × .25). The standard errors in Table 4a are such that effects of this magnitude on the score distribution would, in principle, be detectable at least in the full sample of teachers.
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The upshot of this discussion is that there appears to be enough of a link between Praxis standards and SAT scores for the use of Praxis to have, at least in principle, increased our imputed SAT measure by about 6-14 points, a hypothesis inconsistent with most of the findings in Table 5a . The absence of quality effects in Table 5a may be a consequence of the fact that tests like the Praxis screen out relatively few teachers, or a reflection of our theoretical prediction that testing deters some relatively high-SAT applicants from teaching in public schools. In the next section, we turn to an analysis of additional measures of teacher quality and teacher characteristics.
C. Effects on alternative measures of quality and teacher demographics
Estimated effects of testing on two alternative measures of teacher qualifications-the fraction of teachers that majored in their teaching subject and the fraction of teachers with alternative certification-are reported in the bottom panel of Table 5a . 18 In contrast with the institutional average SAT and Carnegie score, 20 these outcomes vary within institutions. The results in columns 9-12, which show effects on the probability teachers majored in the subject they teach, shed some light on the hypothesis that testing causes schools to hire more desirable teachers from the same colleges. In fact, the probability that a teacher majored in their teaching subject appears to rise in states that impose a subject test. On the other hand, this effect is not very robust. When estimated in the sample of inexperienced teachers, the imposition of a subject test increases the probability teachers teach in their major by about 2.7 percent, with a standard error of 1.1 percent, but the corresponding estimate is about half as large and insignificant in the sample of new teachers.
As a measure of teacher quality, the use of alternative certification methods could be seen as a plus or a minus, depending on the value of traditional certification methods as a quality screen. An important question for our purposes, however, is whether the introduction of tests is confounded with other sorts of licensing reforms. Further, it is important to establish that districts do not avoid testing requirements by hiring more teachers without standard certification. As it turns out, alternative certification is uncorrelated with testing requirements (columns 13-16 of table 5a). This suggests that it is reasonable to look at testing requirements in isolation, and rules out the hypothesis that districts avoid testing requirements by hiring teachers without standard certification.
The last set of estimates looks at the relationship between state testing requirements and the demographic make-up of the teaching labor force. This inquiry is motivated partly by the fact that standardized tests are sometimes thought to be more of a barrier for minorities. The first four columns of Finally, there is no relation between mandatory testing and the fraction of new teachers who are female.
Germany, where faculty are subject to formal testing. The fact that top Ph.D. programs in the US are full of students from these countries suggests they possess a substantial reserve of undergraduate talent. But our impression from discussions with foreign colleagues is that tests in these countries are seen by American-trained Ph.D.s as protecting domestically trained and generally less productive incumbents.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Recent years have seen an acceleration in the use of standardized tests to certify new teachers.
Proponents hope these measures will increase quality, but economists have long been skeptical of entry barriers that shift supply and discourage otherwise qualified individuals from applying for jobs. Our investigation of the impact of the use of tests to certify teachers for employment in public schools suggests state requirements increase the use of tests by about 50 percentage points. Testing requirements are also associated with higher teacher wages, consistent with a supply-shift story. Taking estimates from models that control for state-specific linear trends as representative, the reduced form effect of testing on wages is 3-5%. The implied two-stage least squares effect of the use of tests is twice as large. But there is little evidence of an impact of testing on teacher quality, at least as measured here. Thus, our results are consistent with the view that testing has acted more as a barrier to entry than a quality screen. Another interesting finding is the negative association between teacher testing and the probability new teachers are Hispanic.
As a final bit of anecdotal evidence in support of the skeptical view of testing, it is worth noting that while occupational licensing requirements are widespread and apparently increasing, most skilled workers in the private sector are not subject to formal licensing or testing. For example, like many other professionals involved in research, American professors are not tested by their universities or even by most non-academic employers outside the civil service.
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Concerns about testing notwithstanding, the question of how to increase and maintain the quality of public school teachers. Ballou's (1996) results indicate that teachers' employers pay surprisingly little attention to the selectiveness of applicants' undergraduate institution. Along these lines, Manski (1987) suggested that a floor for teachers' SAT scores could provide a useful screening mechanism. A reliance on
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SATs would appear to avoid some of the problems outlined in our theoretical discussion since this avoids the establishment of a unique barrier to teaching, and may also force school districts to focus more on college quality. This naturally raises the question of whether teachers with higher SAT scores are indeed better teachers, a subject for future research.
DATA APPENDIX
The extract used here was drawn from the Public School Teacher Demand and Shortage Survey (TDSS) component of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS). The TDSS is administered to a stratified random sample of school districts in the U.S. The data used in the analysis are from the restricted-use files of the 1987-88, 1990-91, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 waves of the SASS. Individual teacher-level information is extracted from the Teacher Questionnaire of the SASS. Characteristics of colleges attended by teachers are then merged by college FICE codes to the teacher-level data. These data are then weighted by sampling means, aggregated to the district level, and merged to the district-level TDSS. Finally, state-by-year economic measures are merged to the data set. Districts with fewer than 50 students are dropped from the analysis, as are charter districts in the 1999-2000 wave. Throughout the analysis, first-year teachers are defined as teachers who report their first year of teaching to be the year of the survey. Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers who report their first year of teaching to be less than four years before the year of the survey.
The following definitions were used to create outcome variables extracted from the SASS: or Education Specialist degree with a major in either Biology, Chemistry, Geology/Earth Science, Physics, or another Physical Science. This dummy variable is then aggregated using sampling weights to compute the fraction of first-year teachers and inexperienced teachers for which the dummy is equal to one.
Alternative Certification: Data come from individual teacher responses. Teachers are asked what type of state certification they hold in their main assignment field. A dummy is created that equals zero if the teacher describes his certification as either regular, standard or advanced, and one otherwise. This dummy variable is then aggregated using sampling weights to compute the fraction of first-year teachers and inexperienced teachers for which the dummy is equal to one. .050 Note: District-weighted means are reported. Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience. All salaries are reported in 1999 dollars. Average SAT, Fraction of Teachers who Attended Carnegie I Schools, and Fraction of Teachers with Alternative Certification are measured for all teachers, inexperienced teachers or first-year teachers. For all other variables, district means are estimated using all schools or using the sample of schools that employ either inexperienced or first-year teachers. Note: Left columns of the table reports weighted fractions of districts. The top panel reports fraction (of states or districts) that require new teachers to pass basic skills and/or subject tests to be licensed. The middle panel reports the fraction of districts that report in the SASS that they require teaching candidates to have passed basic skills and/or subject tests. The bottom panel reports the fraction of districts that either report in the SASS that they require teaching candidates to have passed basic skills and/or subject tests or are in a state that requires that they do so. .595 N 3,008 Note: Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience. Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the districts either reports in the SASS that they require teaching candidates to have passed a basic skills or subject test or are in a state that requires that they do so. Reported coefficients are estimated from an OLS regression on state testing requirement dummy variables and a set of controls. Controls include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment. All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience. Reported coefficients are estimated from an OLS regression of log salary on state testing requirement dummy variables and a set of controls. Controls include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment. All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience. Reported coefficients are estimated from an OLS regression of log salary on state testing requirement dummy variables and a set of controls. Controls include state and year fixed effects, state-specific linear trends, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment. All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Inexperienced teachers are defined as teachers with less than 4 years teaching experience. Dependent variables are the fraction of inexperienced or first-year teachers in the district who fall into the respective category. Reported coefficients are estimated from an OLS regression on state testing requirement dummy variables and a set of controls. Controls include state and year fixed effects, city, suburb and rural fixed effects, a quadratic in the state unemployment rate, district enrollment, and district fraction minority enrollment. All regressions are weighted using district sampling weights. Standard errors corrected for state-by-year correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.
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